This paper centers on a case study of CSR performativity during the COVID-19 pandemic. In the extant CSR literature, CSR performativity has focused on “walking the talk” and/or “talking the walk,” wherein narrative and action around CSR are typically treated as two different things with their relationships questioned. We focus on what has been called “t(w)alking” wherein speech is understood to be performative and wherein speech acts and CSR are merged, becoming one and the same thing. Performativity then entails what (...) is (and what is not) said, whereby CSR involves taking responsibility for speech and/or silences. Our thesis is that the COVID-19 pandemic led to the “presenting” of CSR as performativity, in the presence of Levinas' Other, as noble (speech) acts. We examine what became of CSR performativity in a for-profit medical services provider when the COVID-19 pandemic turned fatal for its main client group: the infirm elderly. The performativity of the statement: “The elderly and their carers must be protected” turned out to be crucial and set the stage for the provider's emergency action. Following on insights derived from Nietzsche and Levinas, and more specifically from their views on the particularity of ethical action, we find that CSR morphed into ethical performativity in the case study at hand. Against the backdrop of the views of these thinkers, the research potential of the performativity of “t(w)alking” in future CSR studies emerges and is critically discussed. (shrink)

Explores the nature and types of mystical experience and discusses the value of mysticism for humanity.

Brindley proposed that we initially generate movements , under higher cerebral control. As the movement is practiced, the cerebellum learns to link within itself the context in which the movement is made to the lower level movement generators. Marr and Albus proposed that the linkage is established by a special input from the inferior olive, which plays upon an input-output element within the cerebellum during the period of the learning. When the linkage is complete, the occurrence of the context (represented (...) by a certain input to the cerebellum) will trigger (through the cerebellum) the appropriate motor response. The movement is distinguished from the conscious movement by its now being automatic, rapid, and stereotyped. The idea is still controversial, but has been supported by a variety of animal studies and, as reviewed here, is consistent with the results of a number of human PET and ablation studies. I have added to the idea of context-response linkage what I think is another important variable: novel combinations of downstream elements. With regard to the motor system and the muscles, this could explain how varied combinations of muscles may become active in precise time-amplitude specifications so as to produce coordinated movements appropriate to specific contexts. In this target article, I have further extended this idea to the premotor parts of the brain and their role in cognition. These areas receive influences from the cerebellum; they are active both in planning movements that are to be executed and in thinking about movements that are not to be executed. From recent evidence, the cerebellar output extends even to what has been characterized as the ultimate frontal planning area, the cortex, area 46. The cerebellum thus may be involved in context-response linkage, and response combination even at these higher levels. The implication would be that, through practice, an experiential context would automatically evoke a certain mental action plan. The plan would be in the realm of thought, and could lead to execution. The specific cerebellar contribution would be one of the context linkage and the shaping of the response, through trial and error learning. The prefrontal and premotor areas could still plan without the help of the cerebellum, but not so automatically, rapidly, stereotypically, so precisely linked to context, or so free of error. Nor would their activities improve optimally with mental practice. (shrink)

Excerpt from The Concept of Morals In morals finally we have the doctrine of ethical rela tivity.' It IS the same story over again. Morality ls doubtless human. It has not descended upon us out of the sky. It has grown out of human nature, and is relative to that nature. Nor could it have, apart from that nature, any meaning whatever. This we must, accept. But if this is interpreted to mean that whatever any social group thinks good is (...) good (for that group), that there is no common standard, and that consequently any one moral code is as good as any other, then this relativism in effect denies the difference between good and evil altogether, and makes meaningless the idea of progress in moral con ceptions. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)